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An IPV 2-bidder second-price auction is preceded by two rounds of
bribing: prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to
depart from the auction, so that he (the briber) will become the sole
participant and obtain the good for the reserve price. Bribes are oered
sequentially according to an exogenously given order|there is a rst
mover and a second mover. I characterize the unique ecient collusive
equilibrium in monotonic strategies; in it, the second mover extracts
the entire collusive gain. This equilibrium remains an equilibrium even
when valuations are interdependent, and if they are separable then the
full surplus extraction result continues to hold. Additionally, a family
of pooling equilibria is studied, in which all the types of the rst mover
oer the same bribe.
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11 Introduction
Collusion among participants in auctions is a serious and well-documented
problem.1 In the simplest collusive scenario, the cartel members meet prior
to the auction in order to decide on side-payments and on a representative
bidder, who will bid in the auction on behalf of the cartel. The very rst
question an economist needs to address when modeling such scenarios is: what
is it that the cartel members do before the auction? What is the pre-auction
interaction?
In the existing literature, it is typically assumed that the cartel members
either play a revelation game or a \knockout auction."2 In a revelation game,
each member reports a valuation, and the collusive agreement is determined
as a function of the prole of reports (and possibly further information, such
as the behavior of non-cartel-members). In a \knockout auction," the cartel
members run an auction among themselves, for the right to participate in the
real auction.
Each of these games is a one-shot game. In reality, however, collusive
situations are a special kind of bargaining situations (once a surplus is ex-
tracted from the seller, there is the question how to divide the spoils), and
the latter, by their nature, are sequential. The colluding parties go through a
\face-to-face" negotiation process, that leads to a collusive agreement (or dis-
agreement). During such a negotiation phase there is signaling (the players'
moves are indirect signals of their private information), which gives rise to an
adverse selection problem. Static models, therefore, miss an important aspect
1See, for example, Baldwin et al. (1997), Cassady (1967), and Porter and Zona (1993).
2Leading examples include Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky (1991),
Marshall and Marx (2007), and McAfee and McMillan (1992).
2of the strategic situation; this shortcoming leads me to study the following
game.
I consider an IPV 2-bidder second-price auction which is preceded by two
rounds of bribing; each bidder, in his turn, can oer his rival a bribe in ex-
change for the latter's departure from the auction. Bribes are oered sequen-
tially according to an exogenously given order, and if both oers are rejected
then the pre-auction phase ends, and both bidders go on to compete against
one another in the auction. This game is an extension of the \take-it-or-leave-
it" (TIOLI) game of Es o and Schummer (2004, henceforth ES), which consists
of a second-price auction and a single pre-auction round, in which a designated
player has the opportunity to oer a bribe to his rival in exchange for the latter
to depart, and if it is rejected then the pre-auction phase ends. That is, the
present model is obtained by adding one round of bribing to that of ES.
My goal is to address the following questions in a setting that captures the
aforementioned sequential signaling: (i) is ecient collusion possible, and if
so, what collusive strategies lead to ecient allocation, (ii) what is the inter-
cartel distribution of gains, and (iii) what are the signaling properties of the
equilibrium (i.e., pooling versus signaling). The TIOLI game is a natural rst
step for addressing these issues, but signaling in this game is rather limited,
because, eectively, only the briber can signal his type.3 Additionally, it is
highly asymmetric; many real-life situations, on the other hand, lack such
3Given an oer from the briber, low respondent types accept it and high respondent
types reject it, but in either case this (coarse) signaling by the respondent is irrelevant,
since either reaction eectively ends the game (a continuation game that follows a bribe's
rejection is nontrivial|it is a noncooperative second-price auction|but the signal on the
respondent's type is irrelevant, because it is a weakly dominant strategy for the briber to
bid his valuation, no matter what he thinks about the respondent).
3asymmetry. A setting where both parties play similar (though not identical)
roles is therefore more suited for modeling such situations. Contrasting the
current analysis with that of ES will clarify the dierences between the case
where one side has all the bargaining power and the case where both parties
can initiate collusion.
1.1 Summary of the results
In a bribing game, the amount a briber oers depends on his valuation (type);
his behavior when he bribes is summarized by a bribing function, dened on his
type-space. Considering the TIOLI game, ES derived (under some regularity
conditions on the type distribution) the unique bribery-involving equilibrium
in which the bribing function is continuous. In this equilibrium, ineciency
results with a positive probability, because all the types of the briber above a
certain threshold oer the same bribe, which is accepted by all the types of
the respondent. The reason for this \nonseparation at the top" is that it is
enough for a briber to signal that he is \suciently strong" in order to make
sure that his bribe is accepted.
In contrast to ES, I show that with two rounds of bribing, eciency can
be achieved. Specically, under the assumption that the type distribution of
the rst mover is locally convex at the minimal type, there exists an ecient
equilibrium in monotonic strategies if and only if the expectation of the second
mover's type is at least as large as one half of the maximal valuation. That
is, with the rst and second mover being player 1 and player 2 respectively,
and with i's valuation denoted by i, the condition is E(2)  1
2.4;5 When this
4Valuations are drawn from the unit interval. This is just a normalization.
5E(2)  1
2 is sucient and necessary (for an equilibrium with all the above-mentioned
properties) provided that player 1's type distribution, F1, satises F00
1 (0) > 0. Otherwise, it
4condition is met (and the distribution of the rst mover's type is locally convex
at the minimal type), behavior in a monotonic ecient equilibrium is unique;6
it is described as follows.
First, player 1 oers the dierence between his valuation and his expected
noncooperative payo. More precisely, with the expected payo in the nonco-
operative (dominant strategy) equilibrium of the second-price auction of type
i of player i denoted by 
i(i), player 1's bribe is given by b1(1) = 1 
1(1).
Since b1 is strictly increasing, player 1 reveals his type perfectly on the path.
Seeing player 1's revealed type, player 2 employs an ecient acceptance rule;
then, in case he rejects 1's oer, he responds with the counteroer 
1(1),
which player 1 accepts. In such an equilibrium, player 1's ex post equilibrium
payo equals his expected noncooperative payo. The reason for the full sur-
plus extraction is player 2's positional advantage: he moves second, does not
reveal any private information, and learns player 1's private information before
making his move. This positional advantage translates to an expected payo
of 
2(2)+ C, where C =
R 1
0 [1   
1(1)]f1(1)d1 is the expected surplus ex-
tracted from player 1.
This result is robust in the following sense: even if the IPV assumption is
relaxed, and valuations are allowed to be interdependent, the game admits a
fully-revealing ecient equilibrium which is analogous to the above mentioned
one. Moreover, if the interdependent valuations satisfy a certain separability
condition, then the full surplus extraction result continues to hold: the second
mover extract the entire gain and the rst mover's payo equals his noncoop-
erative payo.
is only a sucient condition.
6That is, there exist, strictly speaking, multiple ecient monotonic equilibria, but they
dier only in o-path information sets.
5I also describe a family of pooling equilibria. In these equilibria, all the
types of player 1 make the same strictly positive oer, to which player 2 re-
sponds with a simple threshold strategy: he accepts the oer if and only if
his type is below a certain threshold; otherwise, he rejects it and makes an
oer of his own; moreover, all the rejecting types of player 2 counter with
the same oer. In such equilibria, low types of player 1 oer a bribe which
exceeds their valuation, because there is a strictly positive probability that it
will be rejected and trigger a generous counteroer. Thus, these equilibria can
be thought of as representing a \blung" phenomenon: low rst-mover types
hide their identity by mimicking high types, hoping that player 2 will \take
the bait" and try to eliminate player 1 in exchange for a positive bribe.
Finally, I show that the following is an equilibrium provided that the types
distributions are log-concave: all the types of the rst mover do not oer a
bribe, and the ES equilibrium is played starting at the second round.
1.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to a growing body of literature on collusion in one-shot
auctions.7 Most of this literature takes the mechanism-design approach to
collusion and studies direct revelation mechanisms which, in many cases, the
cartel operates with the help of an incentiveless third party. Seminal contri-
butions to this literature include Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and
Zemsky (1991), Marshall and Marx (2007), and McAfee and McMillan (1992).
These papers all take the standpoint of the cartel and seek to design mecha-
7A related branch of research considers collusion in a repeated-game setting. Contribu-
tors to this literature include Aoyagi (2002, 2007), Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), Blume
and Heidhues (2006), H orner and Jamison (2007), Rachmilevitch (2009), and Skrzypacz and
Hopenhayn (2004).
6nisms that are desirable for the bidders.
The other side of the \mechanism-design coin" is to take the standpoint of
the seller, and look for auction formats that are immune to collusion. Che and
Kim (2009, henceforth CK) take this approach, and derive a collusion-proof
auction. It is important to note that the work in CK does not invalidate the
contribution of the current paper. First, the current paper assumes that the
seller is not strategic and that he employs a standard auction format (second-
price). CK considers a strategic seller who employs a nonstandard format.
More importantly, the focus of the current paper is on pre-auction signaling
among the bidders, an aspect which is absent from CK, since it models collu-
sion as a one-shot signaling-free stage.8
From the mechanism-design literature, the setting which is closest to the
one considered here is that of the informed-principal problem, which originated
in the pioneering work of Myerson (1983). For example, Maskin and Tirole
(1990, henceforth MT) studied the following extensive-form game. The princi-
pal (rst mover) oers a mechanism to the agent (second mover), who updates
his belief about the principal's type once having seeing his oer. Then, the
agent either accepts or rejects the mechanism, and the principal updates his
belief about the agent's type upon seeing his response. If the mechanism is
accepted, then the players play the game it species, while if it is rejected,
the game ends, in which case they receive their reservation utilities.9 The MT
game resembles my game in that the rst mover's proposal conveys (poten-
tially, at least) information about his type, and the second mover's response
8Dequiedt (2007) and Pavlov (2008) also study collusion-proof auctions. In both of these
papers, as in CK, there is no signaling among the bidders at the pre-auction stage.
9Similar extensive forms have also been utilized in more recent studies of the informed
principal problem, e.g., Severinov (2008).
7conveys (again, potentially) information about his type.
Finally, two works that consider ES-like models (i.e., an auction which is
preceded by a TIOLI stage) are Chen and Tauman (2006) and Kivetz and
Tauman (2010). The former considers a second-price auction in an environ-
ment where, in addition to the cartel members, there is a random population
from which the cartel members can hire shill bidders; the latter considers a
rst-price auction where the bidders' valuations are commonly known among
the bidders.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 lays down the model. Section 3, which is the main body of the
paper, considers ecient collusive equilibria. Section 4 studies a family of
equilibria with complete pooling, Section 5 shows that the ES equilibrium can
be embedded as an equilibrium in the two-round game, Section 6 deals with
interdependent valuations, Section 7 concludes, and the appendices collect
proofs and technical details.
2 Model
There are two risk-neutral expected-utility-maximizing players, player 1 and
player 2, who are about to attend a second-price auction for a single indivisible
good. Player i's valuation for the good (his type) is an independent draw from
Fi, a full-support distribution on [0;1] with a strictly positive and dierentiable
density fi.
The reserve price is zero.10 The auctioneer, who owns the good initially, has
10This assumption can be relaxed; see Remark 6 below.
8no value for it (i.e., his valuation is zero). He awards the good at random, with
probability 1
2 to each player, in case the bids are tied.11 Each player's utility
from nonparticipation (the outside option) is zero. Thus, given the bids (b1;b2),
the associated payo for type i of player i is 1fbi>bjg(i bj)+1fbi=bjg
1
2(i bj).
Throughout the paper, whenever player i and player j are mentioned in the
same sentence, it is implicitly assumed that j 6= i.
Before the auction the players go through two rounds of alternating oers,
where each player can try to bribe his rival (if he wishes) so that the latter
will eliminate himself from the auction. Specically, player 1 oers player 2
a nonnegative bribe, which player 2 can either accept or reject. Acceptance
eectively ends the game: player 1 pays player 2 the oered amount, and in
exchange player 2 eliminates himself from the auction.12 If player 2 rejects
player 1's oer he counters with a nonnegative bribe oer of his own. Now,
player 1 can accept or reject this bribe, and in case of acceptance he eliminates
himself from the auction. Not oering a bribe is a feasible action for either
player, modeled as \oering zero." If both oers are rejected, then the pre-
auction phase ends and the players turn to play the auction noncooperatively,
in which case it is assumed that they bid their valuations truthfully.13
A (pure) strategy for player 1 in this extensive form is a specication of (i)
a bribing function and (ii) a family of acceptance rules|one for every possible
continuation game. For player 2, a (pure) strategy is modeled as a family of
functions fb2(:jx)gx2R+, where b2(:jx) is the function prescribing behavior in
11The tie-breaking rule employed by the auctioneer is not important|the results of this
paper hold for any tie-breaking rule.
12The players can commit: once a player takes a bribe, he commits to staying out of the
auction.
13This is a reasonable assumption, because bidding truthfully is a weakly dominant
auction-strategy for a player independent of his information.
9the continuation game that follows the oer x. For each x, b2(:jx): [0;1] !
R+ [ f\accept"g, where r 2 R+ is interpreted as \reject player 1's oer and
make the counteroer r." I restrict my attention to pure strategies.
I employ the notation b1 to denote player 1's bribing function in the rst
round, and  to denote a generic strategy prole. A strategy  is monotonic
if (i) for player 1, the bribing function b1 is weakly increasing in 1, and (ii) for
player 2, each function b2(:jx) is weakly increasing, where the action \accept"
is identied with the number  1.
2.1 Solution concept
Recall that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a strategy-belief pair,
(;), such that i prescribes a best-response for i against j in each of i's
information sets, and beliefs are derived from Bayes' rule whenever possible.14
Consider the following renement:
 (A) Whenever player 1 sees an unexpected oer x  1 from player 2,
any belief he may form assigns probability 1 to the event f2  xg.
(A) is found in equilibria that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies. Unfortunately, however, iterative dominance presents substantial
problems. In Appendix C, I explain these problems and show that a weaker
version of iterative dominance|one round of deletion of weakly dominated
strategies|overcomes them and implies (A). An equilibrium in Sections 2-5
means an (A)-satisfying PBE. In Section 6 I depart from the IPV setting and
consider interdependent valuations; there, I drop the renement and take PBE
14I do not introduce formal notation for beliefs (as a collection of probability distributions),
since it will not be needed in the sequel.
10to be the solution concept. The reasons for this slight inconsistency will be
explained there.
I will abuse language a little and call an equilibrium monotonic if its
strategy prole has the associated property. The idea behind (or justica-
tion for) a monotonic equilibrium is that players who have a higher valuation
for the good also have a higher willingness to pay for their rival's abstention.
Monotonic equilibria are those equilibria in which the behavior of a briber can
be interpreted as expressing (weakly) this willingness to pay. An equilibrium
is ecient if it leads to a Pareto ecient allocation conditional on every type-
realization.15 An equilibrium is bribery-involving if, under this equilibrium,
bribing occurs with a strictly positive probability.
Remark 1: Our game is a signaling game with a continuum of types. In such
games equilibria are typically insensitive to the behavior of a single (border-
ing) type. For example, suppose that there is an equilibrium in which all types
2 < 1
2 accept a certain bribe b, and all types 2 > 1
2 reject that bribe and
counter it with the same oer. Then the threshold type 2 = 1
2 is indierent
between these two actions; either action can therefore be supported in equi-
librium. Throughout the paper, any statement of the form \ is the unique
PBE prole such that..." means that it is unique up to the behavior of such
bordering types. Similarly, I will sometimes abuse language a little, as follows:
statements of the form \type j accepts a bribe b if and only if b > x" should
15The results of this paper continue to hold if instead of the pointwise-requirement of
eciency, an \ecient equilibrium" would only be taken to mean that it leads to a Pareto
ecient allocation with probability 1. Nothing essential would chance, except that the proof
of the main result would be much more detail-heavy. I therefore adopt the slightly stronger
notion of eciency.
11be interpreted as saying only that bribes b > x are accepted and bribes b < x
are rejected.
Remark 2: I do not impose a condition, analogous to (A), that would restrict
player 2's beliefs in case he sees an unexpected oer from player 1. As opposed
to player 2, who is the last mover and therefore has no reason to oer a bribe
in excess of his valuation, player 1 may oer such a bribe, and, in fact, such
behavior can occur in equilibrium (see Section 4 below).
3 Ecient monotonic equilibria
Recall that 
i(i) denotes i's expected payo in the dominant-strategy equi-
librium of the noncooperative auction. It is readily veried (through integra-
tion by parts, for example) that 
i(i) =
R i
0 Fj(t)dt. Let ~ 1(1;x) denote
the expected payo of type 1 from competing in the auction against player
2 whose type is distributed on [x;1] according to F2jf2xg.16;17 For stating
Theorem 1, we rst need to dene the following strategy prole, ?:
 Player 1 oers bribes according to b1(1) = 1   
1(1). When player 2
sees an oer of the form x 
1(x) for some x 2 [0;1], he rejects it if and
only if 2 > x, in which case he counters with 
1(x); oers greater than
1   
1(1) are also accepted by player 2. Player 1's acceptance policy of
counterbribes b is as follows: If player 1's initial oer was of the form
x 
1(x) for some x 2 [0;1] and player 2 countered with b = 
1(x), then
16Given a cdf F and an event A, FjA denotes the associated conditional distribution.
17Specically, ~ 1(1;x) = 0 for 1  x and ~ 1(1;x) =
R 1
x (1   t)
f2(t)
1 F2(x)dt for 1 > x.
Note that ~ (1;0) = 
1(1).
12player 1 accepts b if and only if b is weakly greater than ~ 1(1;x); in any
other case, player 1 accepts a counterbribe b if and only if 1 < 2b.
Theorem 1. (Characterization of ecient monotonic equilibria) (1) There
exist beliefs ? such that (?;?) is an equilibrium if and only if E(2)  1
2.
(2) If (;) is an ecient monotonic equilibrium and the density of F1, f1,
satises f0
1(0) > 0, then (i) E(2)  1
2, and (ii)  induces the same path of
play as ?.
Remark 3: Suppose that we restrict attention to priors (F1;F2) such that
f0
1(0) > 0. Under this restriction, the condition E(2)  1
2 is sucient and
necessary for the existence of an ecient and monotonic equilibrium. More-
over, such equilibrium, when exists, is unique (up to o-path behavior); it is
bribery-involving.
Remark 4: Without the condition f0
1(0) > 0, the fact that an equilibrium
is ecient and monotonic does not imply that it is bribery-involving (see the
Example below).
Remark 5: Even without the condition f0
1(0) > 0, the inequality E(2)  1
2 is
sucient for ? to be an equilibrium prole. However, it is an open question
whether E(2)  1
2 is necessary for the existence of an ecient monotonic equi-
librium (i.e., it is an open question whether there exists such an equilibrium
in a case where f0
1(0)  0 and E(2) < 1
2).
Remark 6: One can generalize the model as to accommodate a general re-
serve price r 2 (0;1). Then a counterpart of Theorem 1 obtains, where the
collusive strategy is the \r-counterpart" of the aforementioned ?: on its path,
13player 1 of type 1  r oers the bribe 1   
1(1;r), where 
1(:;r) is the ex-
pected payo function in the noncooperative auction with a reserve price r,
and player 2 employs an ecient decision rule and counters with 
1(:;r) fol-
lowing rejections. For uniqueness, a condition analogous to the local convexity
of F1 at the origin is needed. Proving the result for a general r adds no further
insight but entails substantially heavier notation.
In the equilibria described in Theorem 1, player 1 reveals his type by oering
his surplus (the dierence between what he gets in a competition-free world and
what he gets under competition) and player 2 employs an eciency acceptance
rule, which is possible because player 1's surplus is a strictly increasing function
of his type. When player 2 rejects 1's oer, he reacts to it by making the
counteroer 
1(1), which player 1 accepts.18
The reason that E(2)  1
2 is necessary for ? to be supported in equilibrium








18The reader may suspect that once player 1 reveals his type and player 2 rejects his
oer|which, in an ecient equilibrium, is a signal that 2  1|it must be the case that
player 2 counters with an arbitrarily small bribe, because player 1 would agree to any oer
from a stronger opponent. This cannot be a part of an equilibrium, however, because then
low types of player 2 would have an incentive to mimic higher types. In addition, note that
an unexpected bribe indicates that player 2 is not following the equilibrium and therefore
player 1's beliefs are unrestricted in such an information set. In particular, player 1 need
not infer that player 2 is of a higher type, and therefore need not be willing to accept any
bribe.
19See Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
14To see this necessity, assume by contradiction that 
1(1) >
1
2 for some 1,
suppose that this 1 is the type that was truthfully revealed through the rst
oer, and suppose further that 2 > 1. In this case player 2 has protable
deviation from the equilibrium action: to oer 
1(1)  instead of 
1(1), for
some small  > 0. This oer is necessarily accepted by player 1, because he
assigns probability 1 to f2  
1(1) g and will therefore accept the bribe if

1(1)     1   (
1(1)   ), which is clearly satised for a suciently small
 > 0.
The condition f0
1(0) > 0 rules out equilibria in which the event \no brib-
ing" occurs with a strictly positive probability. Without it, equilibria in which
the auction is played noncooperatively with a strictly positive probability are
possible. Here is an example of one such equilibrium; in this equilibrium, the
auction is played noncooperatively with probability 1. Namely, the bribing
stage is eectively skipped.
Example of a \no bribing" equilibrium: Suppose that Fi is uniform for
each i = 1;2. Consider the strategy where player 1 oers zero independent of
his type, player 2 accepts a bribe b if and only if b > 2, player 1 accepts a
counterbribe b if and only if 2b > 1, and the rejections of player 2 are followed
by the counterbribe zero. Call this prole N (the superscript N stands for
\no bribing").
Proposition 1. If Fi is uniform for each i, then there exists a system of beliefs
 such that (N;) is an equilibrium.
To see the rule of the condition f0
1(0) > 0, consider the above-mentioned prole
N. Suppose that player 1 adhered to this strategy and oered nothing, and it
is now player 2's turn to move. If he deviates and oers some small  2 (0;
2
2 ),
15then all types 1  2 would accept it, because player 1 assigns probability
1 to f2  g. Suppose that player 1 is \as optimistic as possible," and he
assigns probability 1 to f2 = g so only 1  2 accept the counterbribe .
Let E = f1 > 2g. Conditional on E player 2's payo from the deviation
equals his payo from the equilibrium strategy, because the auction is played
noncooperatively in either case. Conditional on the complement of E, these
payos are the same if F1 is uniform, because player 2 wins with certainty
and pays  in expectation. However, if f0
1(0) > 0, then in a neighborhood of
0 strong types of player 1 are relatively more likely than weak types, so by
excluding them player 2 gains relatively \a lot." Thus, he strictly prefers to
deviate to some small  > 0, and the equilibrium unravels.
3.1 Payos
In the equilibria described in Theorem 1, player 1's ex post payo equals
his expected noncooperative payo, 
1(1). Player 2's expected payo can
be computed directly from the strategy ?: it is
R 2
0 [2   
1(t)]f1(t)dt +
R 1
2 [t   
1(t)]f1(t)dt  2(2). Note that 2(2) = 
2(2) + C, where C =
R 1
0 [t   
1(t)]f1(t)dt is the expected surplus extracted from player 1. The fact
that this is the expected payo can also be seen in the following alterna-
tive way: we know, due to the classic result of Myerson (1981), that since
?|like the dominant strategies in the noncooperative second-price auction|
implements the ecient allocation, the expected payo of player 2 of type 2
under ? equals 
2(2) + C0, where C0 is the expected payo of player 2's
minimal type under ?. Since under ? the minimal type of player 2 accepts
the bribe of every 1, C0 =
R 1
0 [t   
1(t)]f1(t)dt = C.
163.2 Comparison with the ineciency of the ES equilib-
rium
As was shown by ES, eciency (with probability 1) is impossible in a bribery-
involving equilibrium when there is only one round of oers before a second-
price auction, because perfect signaling of the briber's type is not incentive-
compatible for him. To see this, assume by contradiction that there is an
equilibrium in which the rst mover reveals his type through a strictly in-
creasing bribing function, and consider type 1 = 1; if he mimics type 1   ,
for some small  > 0, then the lowered bribe will surely be accepted, because
player 2 cannot hope to obtain more than  in the auction. This shows that
there must be pooling among all the types of player 1 above a certain thresh-
old.
This is no longer true with two rounds of bribing, because the second round
makes it possible for player 2 to reject an oer without triggering the nonco-
operative auction. Thus, it is not enough for player 1 to signal that his type is
\suciently high" in order to secure acceptance. One can think of the follow-
ing message being implied by player 2 when he rejects a relatively high oer:
\I know that your type is high, but mine is even higher, so you better accept
my counteroer and not compete against me in the auction."
Furthermore, the two-round game looks fundamentally dierent from the
TIOLI game also for the low types of player 1. In the TIOLI game, player 1
will never oer an amount which exceeds his valuation, but he may very well
do so in the two-round game, hoping that his bribe will be rejected and trigger
a generous counteroer. Indeed, this consideration gives rise to equilibria in
which there is complete pooling in the rst round, where all the types of player
1 oer the same strictly positive oer. Low types follow the equilibrium, de-
17spite the fact that they may end up with a negative ex post payo, because
there is a positive probability that player 2's type is high, in which case he
rejects the common bribe and counters it with a positive oer of his own. Such
equilibria are described formally below.
4 Equilibria with complete rst-round pooling
Consider a cdf-pair (F1;F2) for which there exist y;c 2 [0;1] such that the
following conditions hold:
 (I) y   c  F1(2)(y   ) +
R y
2 (y   t)f1(t)dt for all   0,
 (II) c > maxf1   E(2j2  y);F2(y)yg, and
 (III) F2(y)(1   y) + c  1   E(2).
When this is the case, say that (F1;F2) satises (I)-(III) with respect to the
parameters y and c.
Given these numbers y;c 2 [0;1], dene the strategy prole ?(y;c) as
follows. Player 1 oers b = y  c independent of his type, player 2 accepts b if
and only if 2  y, and if he rejects it he counters with c. The counterbribe c is
accepted by all 1. Any o-path oer  made by player 1 is accepted by player
2 if and only if 2  . Any o-path oer  made by player 2 is accepted by
player 1 if and only if 1  2.
When the prole ?(y;c) is followed, there is complete pooling among all
the types of player 1: they all oer b, to which player 2 responds with a simple
cut-o strategy: he accepts b if his type is below the threshold y, and rejects
it and counters it with c otherwise. If (F1;F2) satises (I)-(III) with respect
to the parameters y and c, then this behavior can be sustained in equilibrium.
18Proposition 2. If (F1;F2) satises (I)-(III) with respect to the parameters y
and c then there exist beliefs  such that (?(y;c);) is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3. There exist y;c 2 [0;1], y > c, and cdf-pairs (F1;F2) that
satisfy (I)-(III) with respect to the parameters y and c.
5 Embedding the ES equilibrium in the two-
round game
The equilibria in Section 3 and 4 were obtained under certain distributional
assumptions. One may wonder whether the game has an equilibrium in the
absence of these assumptions, because equilibrium existence is a nontrivial
issue in games such as the one studied here. For example, in Rachmilevitch
(2011) I showed that in the game that consists of a rst-price auction and a
TIOLI bribing protocol, there is a large class of (well-behaved) type distri-
butions given which that game does not have an equilibrium. This section
is dedicated to establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the two-round
second-price game under general conditions.
The following modication of the ES equilibrium comes to mind as a plau-
sible equilibrium candidate for the two-round game: let player 1 oer zero
independent of his type and let the ES equilibrium be played starting at the
second round, with player 2 as the briber and player 1 as the respondent.
Establishing that this path of play is sustainable as an equilibrium is an easy
task, because the only thing that requires verication is that player 1 does
not have an incentive to deviate to a positive bribe; the rest of the incentive
constraints follow form the fact that the continuation game that starts at the
second round is the ES game.
19Proposition 4. Suppose that for each i the distribution Fi is log-concave.
Then the following behavior can be sustained in equilibrium: player 1 oers
zero independent of his valuation, and the ES equilibrium is played in the
continuation game that starts at the second round.
Log-concavity is only needed in the continuation game that starts at the sec-
ond round, because, for technical reasons, it is needed in the equilibrium-
characterization result of ES. I view this technical assumption as a mild one;
most well-behaved distributions considered in the literature are log-concave.
In the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 the rst round is skipped.
Recall that in Proposition 1 we saw a \no bribing" equilibrium, in which both
bribing rounds are skipped. As was explained, if f0
1(0) > then this equilibrium
unravels. Note, that f0
1(0) > 0 is allowed in Proposition 4. The reason for
the dierence is that in the \no bribing" equilibrium player 2's payo equals
his noncooperative payo, 
2(2), and a small positive bribe can improve on
it, provided that f0
1(0) >. In the equilibrium from Proposition 4, by contrast,
player 2's payo is not 
2(2)|it is the rst mover's payo from the ES equi-
librium, which is greater than the competitive payo. In this case, a deviation
to a positive bribe is nonprotable.
6 Interdependent valuations
In this section I depart from the IPV assumption by assuming that a player's
valuation does not coincide with his type; instead, valuations are functions
of both types, hence are interdependent. Player i's valuation from obtaining
the good is v(i;j), and overall preferences, as before, are quasi-linear. The
function v satises v(0;0) = 0 and it is strictly increasing in i, given any
20xed j > 0. I assume that assigning the good to the maximal type is Pareto
ecient,20 and that the function V (x)  v(x;x) is dierentiable with V 0 > 0.
Call these valuations general indeterdependent valuations.
With these general preferences, the second-price auction does not have
weakly dominant strategies and bidding behavior needs to be specied af-
ter every leading-to-the-auction history. In particular, the game is, formally
speaking, a dierent extensive form from the one that was described in Section
2. I do not spell out the formalism of this enriched model, because it will not
be needed (also, it is obvious).
In this model, the equilibria described in Theorem 1 continue to be equilib-
ria. More precisely, there exist equilibria in which player 1 employs a strictly
increasing bribing function, player 2 employs an ecient acceptance rule, and
rejections by player 2 never lead to the auction|they result in an acceptance
by player 1 of a common counterbribe from player 2.
To dene the equilibrium strategy, I rst dene the bribing and counter-







() = V ()   b():
Note that for V (x) = x one obtain the bribing and counterbribing functions
from Theorem 1.
In order to support a path of play analogous to the one from Theorem 1,
one needs to check various deviations and therefore, in particular, to deal with
two kinds of o-path auctions. The two kinds correspond to whether player
20i.e., that a > b implies v(a;b)  v(b;a).
212 deviated after having seen player 1's oer. If he did not, then the auction
to be addressed is a one in which player 1 deviates, by rejecting player 2's
equilibrium counterbribe. This is an auction which is played under the fol-
lowing information: player 1's type is the one he revealed, say x, and player
2's type is distributed according to F2jf2xg. Similarly to Section 3, I de-
note player 1's expected payo in such an auction by ~ 1(1;x). The other
kind of auction that needs to be addressed in a one in which player 2 re-
sponded to b(x) with a deviation|he reciprocated with a counter dierent
than (x). In such an auction in which, in addition, player i believes with
probability one that the opponent's type is j, his expected payo is denoted
by ^ i(i;j).21 I assume that ^ 1(x;0)  (x), that ~ 1(x;x) = ^ 2(x;x) = 0,
and that @
@2v(2;x)  @
@2^ 2(x;x) for all x;2 2 [0;1].22
Let ?? be the following strategy:
 Player 1 oers bribes according to b(1). When player 2 sees an oer
of the form b(x) for some x 2 [0;1], he rejects it if and only if 2 > x,
in which case he counters with (x); oers greater than b(1) are also
accepted by player 2. Player 1's acceptance policy of counterbribes b
is as follows: If player 1's initial oer was of the form b(x) for some
x 2 [0;1] and player 2 countered with (x), then player 1 accepts (x) if
21To be more precise, I assume that there is an equilibrium-selection mapping that gen-
erate the aforementioned functions ~ 1 and (^ i)i=1;2; in the IPV model this equilibrium-
selection mapping is trivial: it always prescribes the dominant-strategy equilibrium.
22For example, one can check that these assumptions are satised in the case where
v(i;j) = i + j, where 0 < jj < 1. In this case the equilibrium-selection mapping
assigns type i the bid (1 + )i. It is easily veried that this behavior is supported by
appropriate beliefs as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the aforementioned o-path auctions.
22and only if it is weakly greater than ~ 1(1;x); in any other case, player
1 accepts a counterbribe b if and only if ^ 1(1;0) < b.
Theorem 2. (Existence of ecient collusive equilibrium under general inter-
dependent valuations) Assume general interdependent valuations. Then there
exists beliefs ?? such that (??;??) is a PBE.
Remark 7: Theorem 2, as opposed to Theorem 1, only addresses equilibrium
existence, not uniqueness. Establishing uniqueness requires elaborate argu-
ments, even in the IPV setting. Many of these arguments refer to o-path
auctions, and since they build on the existence of dominant strategies, they
do not have counterparts in the general interdependent case.
Remark 8: The solution concept in Theorem 2 is simply PBE, not an (A)-
satisfying PBE like in Theorem 1. The reason for not assuming renement
(A) is that in order to prove that the minimal bribe that type 1 is willing
to accept is (1), one needs to prove that any smaller bribe will be rejected.
In Theorem 1, this is done by combining renement (A) with the special
(and simple) payo structure of the dominant strategy equilibrium of the IPV
second-price auction. This is no longer the case where player 1's o-path pay-
os are described by the function ^ 1, so in order to guarantee the optimally
of such rejections, I allow player 1 to adopt the optimistic belief that his de-
viating opponent is of the minimal type, 2 = 0. Note that the reason for
the unattractiveness of such o-path beliefs in the IPV model|the last mover
has no reason to oer more than his valuation|no longer have a bite in the
general interdependent case. This is because of two reasons: rst, \valuation"
no longer equals \type"; second, deviations may be interpreted as signals of
intended bidding behavior|i.e., as an equilibrium-selection device.
23The (general interdependent) valuations are separable if v(i;j) = i+(j)
for some dierentiable function . It turns out that under separability, the full
surplus extraction result from the IPV model continues to hold: the positional
advantage of the second mover enables him to keep the rst mover's payo at
the competitive level, and extract the entire collusive gain.
Theorem 3. (Full surplus extraction under separable interdependent valua-
tions) If valuations are interdependent and separable, then in the equilibrium
described in Theorem 2, player 1's expected payo coincides with his expected
competitive payo|namely, with his payo in the symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative auction.
Theorem 3 refers to player 1's expected payo in the symmetric equilibrium
of the noncooperative auction. Interestingly, it turns out that this payo is
independent of ; in particular, it equals the one from the dominant strategy
equilibrium of the IPV model, the one corresponding to   0.
Proposition 5. Assume separable interdependent valuations. Then the non-
cooperative second-price auction has a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equi-
librium; in it, the expected payo of type i of player i is 
i(i).
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a sequential model of collusion via bribes: two play-
ers are about to attend a second-price IPV auction, prior to which each can
try, in his turn, to bribe his rival to drop out. This is a natural extension of
the \take-it-or-leave-it" (TIOLI) model.
The two models dier along several dimensions. First, whereas eciency is
24possible with two rounds, it is impossible with one round. The reason is that in
the TIOLI game it is enough for the rst mover to signal that he is \suciently
strong" in order to secure acceptance, hence perfect signaling is impossible in
equilibrium. Perfect signaling, however, is necessary for implementing the ef-
cient allocation. With two rounds the aforementioned reasoning no longer
applies. It is no longer true that player 2 will accept player 1's bribe whenever
he infers that the latter is \suciently strong," because it is feasible for him
to decline the bribe without triggering the noncooperative auction. In partic-
ular, perfect signaling can be sustained in equilibrium, and eciency can be
achieved.
The possibility of eciency may seem surprising when contrasted with the
ineciency result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), who showed that (un-
der certain mild conditions) one cannot achieve ex post eciency in a bilateral
trade problem by employing an incentive compatible, budget balanced, indi-
vidually rational mechanism. Stated a little dierently, this impossibility is
about transforming the initial ownership structure, where the seller's share
is one and the buyer's share is zero, to a structure where the former is zero
and the latter is one. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) extended the
Myerson-Satterthwaite setting and considered N agents with ownership shares
(1; ;N) (i  0 for all i and
P
i i = 1), who face the task of transform-
ing it to some other ownership structure (0
1; ;0
N). They showed that
this transformation is achievable via a mechanism with all the aforementioned
properties, provided that the initial shares are suciently egalitarian|i.e.,
suciently close to ( 1
N; ; 1
N). The eciency result of the current paper can
be thought of as corresponding to the case where both \ownership shares" are
zero.
The key point in moving from a TIOLI protocol to a two-round protocol is
25that enlarging the set of possible responses of the second mover enlarges the
set of the game's equilibria. Not only separating|pooling equilibria also come
into existence when a round of oers is added. By contrast, the equilibria of
the TIOLI game are \in between" these extremes|every TIOLI equilibrium
involves separation among low types and pooling among high types.23
An analysis analogous to the one presented in the current paper can be
carried out for other auction formats. The main feature that distinguishes the
second-price format is that the behavior in the auction|truthful bidding|is
independent of the pre-auction activity. This separation no longer exists with
other formats. For example, in Rachmilevitch (2011) I showed that when an
IPV rst-price auction is preceded by a TIOLI stage, the information which is
inferred from the bribing stage necessarily aects the bidding behavior in the
auction; moreover, the link between the two unravels any bribery-involving
continuous equilibrium: the only equilibrium of the rst-price TIOLI game in
which the bribing function is continuous is such that the bribing function is
identically zero. As for the two-round game, under a slight modication of
the solution concept, the path of the equilibria from Theorem 1 can also be
sustained in equilibrium under the rst-price format.24
23As mentioned in subsection 1.1, ES derive the unique equilibrium of the TIOLI game in
which the bribing function is continuous; this function is strictly increasing up to a certain
threshold, and is constant from this threshold onwards. In addition, ES derive all the D1-
satisfying equilibria of the TIOLI game; the bribing function in each such equilibrium is
strictly increasing up to a threshold x < 1 and is constant on (x;1]. Moreover, it coincides
with the bribing function of the unique continuous equilibrium on [0;x); the threshold x is
its unique discontinuity point.
24Instead of PBE, one needs to consider essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE)
when the format is rst-price; EPBE is due to Blume and Heidhues (2006); see Rachmilevitch
(2010) for details.
26The following question remains, at present, open: I do not know whether
the two-round (IPV) game has fully-revealing equilibria other than the e-
cient one. This turns out to be a dicult problem even in the special case
where both type distributions are uniform.
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8 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
The following lemmas will be needed for the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. E(2)  1
2 if and only if 
1(1) 
1
2 81 2 [0;1].
Proof. Suppose that 
1(1) 
1
2 81 2 [0;1]. Taking 1 = 1 gives 1 E(2) 
1
2, or E(2)  1
2. Conversely, suppose that E(2)  1
2. We need to prove
that (1)  0, where (1) 
1
2   
1(1). Note that 0(1) = 1
2   F2(1),
hence 00(1) =  f2(1)  0, so  is concave. Also, (0) = 0 and (1) =
1
2   (1   E(2)) = E(2)   1
2  0, where the inequality is by assumption.
Therefore, (1)  1(1) + (1   1)(0) = 1(1)  0.
Let:
Z(x;1)  F2(x)(1   x + 

1(x)) + (1   F2(x))maxf

1(x); ~ 1(1;x)g
27where ~ 1(1;x) denotes 1's expected payo in the noncooperative auction
against player 2 whose type is distributed on [x;1] according to the conditional
distribution F2jf2xg.
Denition 1. The distribution function F2, dened on [0;1], satises condi-
tion C1 if x = 1 is a maximizer of Z(:;1).
Condition C1 is simply the incentive compatibility constraint of the maximal
type of player 1 in the rst information set in the game. As the following
lemma shows, if this constraint is satised for the maximal type (i.e., if C1
holds), then it is satised for all types.
Lemma 2. If C1 is satised, then x = 1 is a maximizer of Z(:;1) for all
1 2 [0;1].
Proof. Suppose that C1 is satised. Assume by contradiction that x = 1
does no maximize Z(:;1) over [0;1], for some 1 2 [0;1]. Clearly we can
assume that 1 > 0. Since the objective is continuous and [0;1] is compact, a
maximizer x 2 [0;1] exists. First, I argue that x < 1. To see this, assume
by contradiction that x  1. Then, x is a maximizer of Z(:;1) over [1;1].








The FOC is f2(x)(1  x), which is negative on (1;1], hence on this range the
maximum is at x = 1, a contradiction. Hence, as was argued, x < 1.
It is easy to see that there is a unique m = m(1) 2 (0;1) such that the
objective satises (1) on [m;1]. Since on that sub-domain 1 is the unique
maximizer of Z(:;1), we only need to consider [0;m], where the objective
takes the form
















(1   t)f2(t)dt >
Z 1
0











Adding F2(x)(1   1) =
R x




















(1   t)f2(t)dt >
Z 1
0
(1   t)f2(t)dt = Z(1;1);
in contradiction to C1.
The following lemma guarantees that the incentive constraint of the maximal
type, C1, is indeed satised.
Lemma 3. Evey distribution F2 satises condition C1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists an F2 such that there exists
an x < 1 such that Z(x;1) > Z(1;1) = 
1(1). By Lemma 2, it must be that
this x is suciently small, so that ~ 1(1;x)  
1(x), and consequently the value
of the objective satises


















0 (1   t)f2(t)dt =
R x





1(x) + F2(x)(1   x), we obtain












With the lemmas at hand, we can turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof. (1). If E(2)  1
2, then there exist beliefs  such that (?;) is an
ecient monotonic equilibrium:25 Let  be a system of beliefs such that (i)
when player 2 sees an oer of the form x 
1(x) for some x 2 [0;1], he assigns
probability 1 to the event f1 = xg, while when he sees an oer strictly greater
than 1   
1(1) he assigns probability 1 to the event f1 = 1g, and (ii) in the
information set following the rejection of the rst oer b1 where player 2 oered
the counterbribe b2, player 1's beliefs are the following: if b1 = x   
1(x) for
some x 2 [0;1] and b2 = 
1(x), then 1 believes that 2 is distributed according
25The \only if" statement follows (easily) from the combination of (i) Lemma 1, and (ii)
the explanation in the text that follows Remark 6.
30to F2jf2xg; otherwise, he believes that f2 = minfb2;1gg.
It is easy to see that ? is ecient and monotonic. We need to prove that
?
i prescribes a best-response for i against ?
j, in each of i's information sets
(given his belief i).
Start with player 1. Suppose that he is of type 1 2 [0;1]. First, I argue
that he does not have a strictly protable deviation in the rst node in the
game tree. To see this, note that if there exists such a deviation to a dierent
bribe, then there exists such a deviation where he mimics a dierent type (be-
cause all oers above 1 
1(1) are accepted by player 2). But this contradicts
the fact that x = 1 is a maximizer of Z(:;1), which, in turn, is guaranteed
by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Next, consider the information set where player 1 responds to player 2's
counteroer b2. Suppose rst that player 1's initial oer was of the form
x   
1(x) for some x 2 [0;1] and player 2 countered with b2 = 
1(x). Then
clearly following ?
1|by denition|is a best-response. In any other case player
1 believes that f2 = minfb2;1gg. If minfb2;1g = 1 the obviously acceptance
of b2 is a best-response, and this is the response instructed by ?
1. If, on the
other hand, minfb2;1g = b2, then since player 1's belief assigns probability
1 to the event f2 = b2g, it follows that accepting the bribe if and only if
b2  1   b2|as instructed by ?
1|is a best-response.
Consider now player 2 of an arbitrary type 2 2 [0;1]. In his rst infor-
mation set in the game he responds to player 1's oer. If this oer takes the
form x   
1(x) for some x 2 [0;1], he infers that 1 = x. First, I argue that
any counter-oer b < 
1(x) is rejected. To see this, assume by contradiction
that there exists a counter-oer b < 
1(x) which is accepted by player 1. This
oer is accepted if and only if 1  2b, or x
2  b. Combining these inequalities
we obtain x
2 < 
1(x); however, since E(2)  1




Hence, player 2 has eectively three options: (a) to accept the bribe
x   
1(x), (b) to reject and counter with 
1(x), which is accepted by player
1,26 and (c) to compete in the noncooperative auction against type 1 = x.
Consider rst 2 < x. Here, we need to prove that acceptance is a
best-response. If player 2 rejects the bribe then the best he can obtain is
maxf2   
1(x);0g < x   
1(x), and therefore adhering to ?
2 is a best-
response. Consider now 2  x. Here, we need to prove that countering
with 
1(x) is a best-response. First, note that doing so is weakly better than
accepting player 1's oer, and is strictly better if 2 > x. This follows from
2   
1(x)  x   
1(x). Secondly, this is also better than competing the auc-
tion, because 2   
1(x)  2   x.
Next, consider the case where player 2 sees an oer strictly greater than
1   
1(1). Since he believes that 1 = 1, acceptance of this oer is a best-
response.
Therefore, (?;) is an equilibrium.
(2). Suppose that f0
1(0) > 0 and let (;) be an ecient monotonic equilib-
rium. Then, E(2)  1
2, and  has the same path of play as ?.
Let b1 denote player 1's bribing function.
Claim 1: b1 is strictly increasing.
Proof of Claim 1: Assume by contradiction that there exists some nondegen-
26The counter-bribe 
1(x) is accepted by player 1 of type 1 = x because 
1(x) 
~ 1(x;x) = 0.
32erate interval I on which b1 is constant, taking the value b.
Case 1: There exists such an I with b > 0.
Let 1  infI.
Case 1.1: 1 > 0. Let (1;1 + )  J, where  2 (0;b). By eciency, all
2 2 J reject b. Let : J ! R+ denotes player 2's counterbribing function
on this domain.
Case 1.1.1:  is constant on a nondegenerate subinterval of its domain,
J0  J. Let b0 denote its level on J0. Note that b0 > 0. To see this, assume
by contradiction that b0 = 0 and consider a type 2 2 J0. When he rejects b
and counters with b0 = 0, the oer b0 = 0 is rejected by player 1 with probabil-
ity 1;27 hence, this behavior gives 2 a payo which is bounded form above by
 < b, and it therefore cannot be a part of an equilibrium. Thus, b0 > 0. Since
all 1 arbitrarily close to 1 reject b0, it follows that there exists a 
2 < 1 who
rejects b and counters with b0 (otherwise, if only 2  1 oered the counter
b0 > 0, it would not be incentive compatible for types 1 near 1 to reject it ).
Therefore b0 is rejected with probability 1 by player 1; therefore, rejecting b
and countering with b0 is not a best-response for such a 
2 < 1.
Case 1.1.2: There does not exist a subinterval J0  J on which  is
constant. Then, by monotonicity, every type 2 2 J reveals himself via his
counter bribe (2); namely, the following holds for every  > 0: (2   ) <
(2) < (2 + ) (if one of these inequalities was an equality, then an in-
terval J0 would have existed). Consider types 1 2 I and 2 2 J such that
(2) > maxf1  2;0g. Conditional on this realization of types, play goes as
follows: player 1 oers b, which is rejected by player 2, who counters it with
27In equilibrium player 1 can accept the counter oer b0 = 0 only if he is certain that
2  1. Thus, only type 1 = 1 can accept it in equilibrium.
33the revealing oer (2); it is the unique best-response of player 1 to accept
this counteroer, in contradiction to eciency.
Case 1.2: 1 = 0. Here, b1 is constant at the level b > 0 on an interval of
the form [0;x) for some x > 0. All 2 < b accept this bribe, in contradiction
to eciency.
Case 2: b = 0 for every interval I on which b1 is constant.
In this case b1  0 on an interval of the form [0;x) for some x > 0. Wlog,
suppose that x is the supremum number for which this is true. Since all 2 > 0
reject the oer 0, there is a probability F1(x) > 0 that play will go to the sec-
ond round, where the continuation game is a TIOLI game, played with the
following beliefs: the distribution of 2 is given by F2 and the distribution of
1 is given by G  F1jf1<xg. Let g  G0. Let b2  b2(:j0) denote 2's bribing
function in this continuation game.
I argue that b2  0 on [0;x). To see this, assume by contradiction that
b2(2) > 0 for some 2 < x. If there exists a 0
2 2 (2;x) such that b2(0
2) =
b2(2)  b, then b2 is constant at the level b > 0 on some interval J. Wlog,
suppose that J is the maximal such interval (i.e. the union of all such inter-
vals). All types 1 suciently close to infJ accept the bribe b, and therefore
the probability of ineciency is positive. If, on the other hand, there does not
exist such a 0
2, then b2 is strictly increasing on (2;x), and again we conclude
that the probability of ineciency is strictly positive (given each revealed type
0
2 2 (2;x), all types above and close to him accept his bribe, because bidding
in the auction is truthful). Thus, b2  0 on [0;x).
Let 0 < 2 < x and let  2 (0;
2
2 ). When player 1 is contemplating accep-
tance vs. rejection of  (in the continuation game which follows the rejection
of 0), he compares the two associated payos. The payo from acceptance
34is obvious, . The payo from rejection is the expected payo in the non-
cooperative auction, which is bounded from above by maxf1   ;0g. To see
why this is an upper bound, note that there are exactly two possibilities: (i)
 constitutes a detectable deviation (i.e., there does not exists a 2  x such
that b2(2) = ), or (ii) there exists some 2  x such that b2(2) = . In
case (i) the fact that maxf1   ;0g is an upper bound on the payo player 1
expects follows from the fact that player 2 will bid his valuation truthfully in
the auction and player 1 believes that 2  . As for case (ii), note that if 2
oers  in equilibrium then 2  ; otherwise, he would be better o oering
zero.
Therefore, a sucient condition for acceptance of  is 1  < , or 1 < 2.
Therefore, 2's expected payo from the deviation  is bounded from below by







where M(;t) is dened as the minimum utility that player 1 of type 1 = t
can impose on player 2 of type 2 following the oer , given that the players





minf2   ;2   tg if t  2
0 if t > 2












The equality in (3) follows from the fact that in the range 2  t  2 we have
M(;t) = minf2   t;2   g = 2   t, where the latter equality follows from
t  2 > . Therefore, 2's expected payo if he deviates to  is bounded from
35below by the RHS of (3). Setting z  2, we see that his payo is bounded
from below by







Note that  (0) equals 2's equilibrium payo.28 Therefore, it must be that  
is locally non-increasing in a neighborhood of 0. I will now prove that this
is not the case. Indeed, the rst two derivatives of   are zero and the third
































Thus, Claim 1 is proved|b1 is strictly increasing on [0;1].
When 1 oers b1(1) he reveals his identity. By eciency, all 2 > 1 reject
this oer. Consider 2 < 1. If he rejects the bribe then the auction results
(because of eciency), which gives him a zero payo; we conclude then, that
on the equilibrium's path, player 2 accepts b1(1) if and only if 2 < 1. More-
over, types 2 > 1 who reject b1(1) counter with an oer of their own. To see
this, note that such 2's who are suciently close to 1 prefer b1(1) to the non-
cooperative auction and therefore they counter with a bribe oer that player
28In this equilibrium player 2 of type 2 oers 0 (in this continuation game), which is
rejected. This leads to a noncooperative play of the auction against player 1 whose type is
distributed according to G, giving the expected payo
R 2
0 (2   t)g(t)dt =  (0).
361 accepts. Moreover, they all counter with the same bribe. This is the case
because they players play pure strategies; two types 2;0
2 > 1 cannot oer
dierent counterbribes in equilibrium, because such bribes|if oered on the
path|would both be accepted by player 1; this, in turn, means that oering
the higher counterbribe is not incentive compatible. Therefore, when 1 reveals
himself through the bribe b1(1), all 2 < 1 accept it and all 2 > 1 reject it
and counter it with a common oer, (1), which player 1 accepts. Since the
threshold type 2 = 1 is indierent between acceptance and rejection,
b1(1) = 1   (1): (4)
When player 1 of type 1 makes the rst move in the game, he can nonde-
tectably mimic any other type x; therefore, his objective is to maximize the
following
(xj1) = F2(x)(1   b1(x)) + (1   F2(x))maxf(x); ~ 1(1;x)g:
By Myerson's result (see subsection 3.1 in the text above), (1j1) = 
1(1)+
C, where C is some constant. I argue that C = 0. To see this, note
that (0j0) = maxf(0); ~ 1(0;0)g = (0), and therefore, since 
1(0) = 0,
C = (0). Then, C = 0 follows from (4). Combining (1j1) = 
1(1) with
(4) and ~ 1(1;1) = 0 we obtain (1) = 
1(1).
Finally, I argue that E(2)  1




2 for every 1. To see this, assume by contradiction that there exists
some 1 for which (1) >
1
2 . Consider the case where player 1 of type 1
reveled himself through the oer b1(1) and it is now player 2's turn to respond,
and 2 > 1. I argue that 2 has a protable deviation: to counter with
1
2 + ,
where  > 0 is suciently small, so that
1
2 +  < (1). To prove that this
37deviation is protable, it is sucient to prove that it will be accepted by player
1 with certainty. Note that this deviation by player 2 is a detectable deviation:
player 1 expects to see the oer (1), but instead he sees a dierent oer.
Thus, he needs to revise his beliefs, and by assumption he assigns probability
1 to the event f2 
1
2 + g. Thus, if he rejects player 2's oer he expects his







player 2's oer is accepted and hence constitutes a protable deviation.
9 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma will be needed for the proof.
Lemma 4. Under ??, player 1 does not have an incentive to deviate when he
makes the rst move in the game; i.e., the bribe b(1) is ex ante optimal.
Proof. Clearly there is no reason to oer more than b(1). When type 1 mimics











v(1;t)f2(t)dt + (1   F2(x))V (x)   b(x):
The derivative of this expression is f2(x)(v(1;x) v(x;x))+[(1 F2(x))V 0(x) 
b0(x)]. Since the bracketed term is zero, x = 1 is an optimum.
We can now turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof. Let ?? be a system of beliefs such that (i) when player 2 sees an oer of
the form b(x) for some x 2 [0;1], he assigns probability 1 to the event f1 = xg,
while when he sees an oer strictly greater than b(1) he assigns probability 1
38to the event f1 = 1g, and (ii) in the information set following the rejection of
the rst oer b1 where player 2 oered the counterbribe b2, player 1's beliefs
are the following: if b1 = b(x) for some x 2 [0;1] and b2 = (x), then 1 believes
that 2 is distributed according to F2jf2xg; otherwise, he believes that 2 = 0.
We need to prove that ??
i prescribes a best-response for i against ??
j , in
each of i's information sets (given his beliefs).
Start with player 1. Suppose that he is of type 1 2 [0;1]. The fact that he
does not have a protable deviation when he makes the rst move in the game
is established in Lemma 4. Next, consider the information set where player 1
responds to player 2's counteroer b2. Suppose rst that player 1's initial oer
was of the form b(x) for some x 2 [0;1] and player 2 countered with b2 = (x).
Then clearly following ??
1 |by denition|is a best-response. It is easy to see
that the response that ??
1 assigns to him is optimal also in the complement of
this event.
Consider now player 2 of type 2 2 [0;1]. In his rst information set in
the game he responds to player 1's oer. If this oer takes the form b(x) for
some x 2 [0;1], he infers that 1 = x. First, I argue that any counteroer
b2 < (x) is rejected. To see this, assume by contradiction that there exists a
counteroer b2 < (x) which is accepted by player 1. This oer is accepted if
and only if ^ 1(x;0) < b2, in contradiction to ^ 1(x;0)  (x).
Therefore, player 2 has eectively three options: (a) to accept the bribe
b(x), (b) to reject and counter with (x), which is accepted by player 1,29 and
(c) to compete in the noncooperative auction against type 1 = x.
Consider rst 2 < x. Here, we need to prove that acceptance is a
best-response. If player 2 rejects the bribe then the best he can obtain is
29The counterbribe (x) is accepted by player 1 of type 1 = x because (x)  ~ 1(x;x) =
0.
39maxfv(2;x)   (x);0g < v(x;x)   (x) = b(x), and therefore adhering to
??
2 is a best-response. Consider now 2  x. Here, we need to prove that
countering with (x) is a best-response. First, note that doing so is weakly
better than accepting player 1's oer, and is strictly better if 2 > x. This
follows from v(2;x) (x)  v(x;x) (x) = b(x). Secondly, this is also bet-
ter than competing the auction, because v(2;x)   (x)  ~ 2(2;x).30 Next,
consider the case where player 2 sees an oer strictly greater than b(1). Since
he believes that 1 = 1, acceptance of this oer is a best-response. Therefore,
(??;??) is a PBE.
10 Appendix C: Deletion of weakly dominated
strategies
Condition (A) is satised by PBE that survive iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies. Unfortunately, however, this renements is problematic
because of the following reasons. First of all, when deleting weakly dominated
strategies \order matters." A natural remedy to this diculty is to assume
that in every round all the weakly dominated strategies are deleted.31 Even if
we adopt this maximal deletion approach, one serious problem still remains:
it is not known how the entire deletion process looks like, and it is therefore
unknown whether there exist strategy proles that survive this deletion. I
30To see that v(2;x)  ~ 2(2;x) + (x), note (i) this inequality holds at 2 = x, be-
cause ~ 2(x;x) = 0 and v(x;x) = V (x) =
R x
0 V 0(t)dt 
R x




31This is the common approach to deletion of weakly dominated strategies. See, for
example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 461).
40therefore consider the following weaker version of this renement|I will con-
sider a single round of deletion. That is, with i's set of strategies in the game
denoted by i, keeping the entire i xed, I delete all the weakly dominant
strategies for j; the resulting set is denoted 1
j. Let G denote the original
game|the one with strategy sets i, and let G0 denote the game which is the
same as G, except that the strategy sets are 1
i.
Lemma 5. If (;) is a PBE of G0 then it is an (A)-satisfying PBE of G.
Proof. First, I will prove that any strategy that instructs player 2 to counter
an oer with a bribe which is greater then his valuation is deleted, and is
therefore outside 1
2. Consider a strategy 2 that instructs player 2 to counter
b with some x > 2 for some b and 2. Let 0
2 be identical to 2 except
that it instructs player 2 to counter b with zero whenever 2 instructs him to
counter with an oer which exceeds his valuation. Clearly 0
2 does at least as
good as 2 against any strategy that player 1 may play. Consider the strategy
for player 1 where all 1 oer b and accept any counterbribe (including zero)
if b is rejected. Clearly, 0
2 does strictly better than 2 against this strategy.
Therefore, player 2 does not have strategies in G0 that instruct him to counter
with oers which exceed his type. In particular, if (;) is a PBE of G0 then 
assigns zero probability to such behavior (in any information set). Therefore,
if this is a PBE in G, then it is an (A)-satisfying PBE of G. I argue that indeed
(;) is a PBE of G. To see this, assume by contradiction that some player
i has a protable deviation in some information set. Clearly we can assume
that the deviation is to an undominated strategy and is therefore feasible in
G0. But this contradicts the assumption that (;) is a PBE in G0.
Next, I prove that the ecient monotonic equilibria which were studied in the
paper survive one round of deletion.
41Lemma 6. There exist beliefs such that (?;) is a PBE of G0.
Proof. Since there exist beliefs  such that (?;) is a PBE of G, it is enough
to prove that ?
i 2 1
i for each player i.
Start with i = 1. Suppose that ?
1 is weakly dominated by some other
strategy 1. First, I argue that 1 prescribes the same bribing function as
?
1. To see this, let b1 be the bribing function under ?
1 and let B1 be the
one under 1. Let 1 2 [0;1]. Let x  b1(1) and y  B1(1). I argue that
x = y. Consider the following strategy of player 2: the bribe x is rejected
(by all 2) and followed by the counteroer 1, and any other bribe is rejected
and countered with zero. Since 1 needs to do at least as good as ?
1 against
any possible strategy of player 2, x = y. Next, I argue that 1 instructs the
same acceptance policy of counterbribes, and therefore it coincides with ?
1.
To see this, suppose now that player 1 employs the bribing function b1, oers
1 
1(1), and his oer is rejected and countered with b. If b = 
1(1) then 1
must prescribe acceptance, because player 2 may be playing ?
2. If b 6= 
1(1)
then 1 must assign acceptance if and only if 2b > 1, because it may be the
case that player 2 plays a strategy that instructs him to oer his valuation
following a rejection. Therefore, there does not exists a strategy that weakly
dominates ?
1.
Consider now i = 2. Bribes greater than 1 
1(1) must be accepted because
it may be the case that player 1 plays the following strategy: all 1 < 1 oer
0 and 1 = 1 oers the aforementioned bribe, and he rejects all counterbribes.
Since player 1 maybe playing ?
1, it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that
if 2 does at least as good against ?
1 as ?
2, then the responses it prescribes to
oers in [0;1   
1(1)] coincide with the ones prescribed by ?
2.
4211 Appendix D: Additional proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider player 1. The expected payo correspond-









which is clearly maximized at x = 0. It is straightforward that a deviation to
x > 1 cannot be protable. Next, consider player 2 who needs to respond to
a bribe b  2. Assume by contradiction that he reacts to it with a deviation
to a positive counteroer, x 2 (0;1]. Let player 1's believes be such that he
assigns probability 1 to f2 = xg, hence accepting x if and only if 1  2x.
Thus, we can restrict our attention to deviations x 2 (0; 1
2]; each such x gives







2 , so adhering
to the equilibrium strategy is optimal. Therefore, N can be supported in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Make the assumptions of the proposition. The
renement (A) does not impose any restriction on player 2's beliefs, so we can
chose any belief we like in order to support his acceptance rule as optimal when
he sees an unexpected oer  6= b. Thus, when player 1 makes a detectable
deviation , he obtains the expected payo




The derivative of this expression is  F2() and the corresponding value at
 = 0 is the noncooperative payo, 
1(1). Thus, it is sucient to prove that
following the strategy gives a payo weakly greater than the noncooperative
payo. The expected payo from following the strategy is F2(y)[1  b]+(1 
F2(y))c. Substituting b = y   c gives that this expected payo is h(1) 
F2(y)(1   y) + c. Thus, it suces to prove that h(1)  
1(1) for all 1 2
43[0;1]. Since both are increasing, h is linear and 
1 is convex, it is sucient
to show that h(x)  
1(x) for x 2 f0;1g. The inequality h(0)  
1(0),
or  F2(y)y + c  0, is guaranteed by (II); the inequality h(1)  
1(1) is
guaranteed by (III). Next, consider player 1 who faces the oer c. By (II) it
is optimal for type 1 = 1 to accept c, and therefore it is optimal for every
1 2 [0;1].
Next, consider player 2. It will be convenient to dene




We need to establish that his response to the on-path oer b is optimal. Sup-
pose rst that 2 < y. Assume by contradiction that he has a strictly protable
deviation. This deviation involves rejection and a counteroer . It must be
that  6= c, because the payo corresponding to  = c is 2   c < y   c =
b. Thus, the expected payo corresponding to the deviation is (;2) 
(;y)  b, where the rst inequality follows from @
@2(;2) = F1(2)  0.
Suppose, on the other hand, that 2 > y. Clearly acceptance is sub-optimal.
Suppose then that there exists a protable deviation to a counteroer  6= c.









F1(t)dt  (y c)+(2 y) = 2 c;
because (;y)  y   c by (I), in contradiction to the protability of the
deviation.
Proof of Proposition 3: I will prove that there exist an  2 (0;1) such that
the following is true: If F1(t) = F2(t) = t for some  2 [;1], then (F1;F2)
satises (I)-(III) with respect to y and c, for some y;c 2 [0;1]. Recall (;2)




For  2 (0;1] the bracketed term is nonpositive, so (I) is implied by




The conditional expectation E(2j2  y) is given by E(2j2  y) = 
1+ 
1 y1+
1 y . Thus, the rst inequality that (II) requires is





1   y =
1   (1 + )y + y1+
(1 + )(1   y)
(6)









Our task is to nd y;c 2 [0;1] that satisfy (5)-(8) for all  > 0 suciently
close to 1.
Take y = (1
2)
1
 and c = 2
3y.





3y = c, so (7) holds. Next, note








the latter is satised as a strict inequality at  = 1. Similarly, (6) also boils
down to 1
3  1





holds for all  near 1.
Proof of Proposition 4: In view of the argument in the beginning of the
proof of Proposition 2, it is enough to show that under the equilibrium which
is described in Proposition 4 player 1's payo is weakly greater than 
1(1).
45Given a type 2 let 
1(1j2) be player 1's payo in the noncooperative auction
against 2; similarly, given a set of types of player 2, A, let 
1(1jA) be player
1's noncooperative payo conditional on 2 2 A. Let bES be the bribing
function in the ES equilibrium and let 2 be the unique point from which
onwards it is constant. Player 1's expected payo from the behavior described














Obviously, X  
1(1j2  2); thus, it is enough to show that bES(2) 

1(1j2  2). Note that since type 1 = 1 accepts bES(2) in the ES equilib-
rium, bES(2)  
1(1j2  2). The proof is now completed by the fact that

1(1j2  2)  
1(1j2  2).
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that player 2 employs the (increasing)
bidding function b. When player 1 of type 1 mimics submit the bid of type














If x = 1 is an optimum then b(t) = t + (t). The payo for type 1 from










Proof of Theorem 3: To show that type 1's equilibrium payo equals his








Note that both sides equal zero at 1 = 0. The derivative of the LHS (wrt
1) is f2(1)1 + F2(1) + (1)f2(1)   f2(1)(1 + (1)) + (1   F2(1)))(1 +
0(1))   b0(1) = F2(1), which equals that of the RHS.
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